

































































In the second part of 2014 the oil price began on a downward trend that eventually would                                 
make it to fall 70 $ (approximately 65%) and it has since then stayed low. This made                                 
international organizations like the IMF and important researchers (Arezki, Blanchard, 2015)                     
to predict tha6t the oil price fall would boost the world economy. When this failed to happen                                 
the question was raised to how the oil­macroeconomy relationship works. This is what this                           
thesis will try to answer.  
We will do this by evaluating the Mundell­Fleming model with regard to how an exogenous                             
oil shocks affect interest rates and output. We will do this by emulating the paper ​Oil Price                                 
Shocks and Real GDP Growth: Empirical Evidence for Some OECD Countries. ​Rebeca                       
Jiménez­Rodríguez, and Marcelo Sánchez (2005) and then compare the result to the                       
prediction from the Mundell­Fleming framework​.. ​First, our analysis includes a later time                       
period than Jim​é​nez­Rodr​íguez and Marcelo S​á​nchez. Second, ​we will also add a financial                         
stress variable, recommended by Nazlioglu, Soytas and Gupta (2015) to a subsample of the                           
study to see if this variable changes the result. Our selection will be of the G7 countries. In                                   
the G7, we get developed economies with both oil producers and oil importers. 
Our results can be summarized as follows. We find an asymmetric relationship between oil                           
price increases and GDP growth while the interest­oil symmetric macroeconomic relationship                     
holds except for the short term rates to an increasing oil price. We can thereby conclude that                                 
the Mundell­Fleming predictions of what will happen in the short run after an oil shocks fits                               
badly to our sample. There is reason to question the stability of the oil price parameters after                                 
2008 when the financial crisis turned macroeconomic data on it's head. The effect of the post                               
2008 data on the result could be a factor to explain our result. When adding the financial                                 
stress variable to the restricted sample we experienced different results with some granger                         
causality relationship disappearing and some appearing. Our conclusion is, as suggested by                       




Jiménez­Rodríguez and Sánchez (2005) use a vector autoregressive model with both linear                       
and asymmetric oil variables to evaluate oil price changes and its effect on economic activity.                             
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Their results points to that the context in which the oil shock takes place is vital to the effect                                     
it will have on GDP growth. In a context of high price stability, the effect on GDP growth is                                     
stronger than in a context of high volatility. Nazlioglu, Soytas and Gupta (2015) show how                             
there are volatility spillover effects between financial stress and oil prices that run both ways                             
before a crisis, a causal link between oil prices and to financial stress after the crisis and a                                   
causal link between financial stress and oil prices during a crisis. This suggests that besides                             
direct effect of oil and/or financial crisis on the economy there can be secondary indirect                             
effects when the two markets continue to affect each other after the crisis. This relationship                             
between the energy market and the financial market could make the effect prolonged on the                             
economy. They recommend for future research that you take both these variables into account                           
when analyzing how financial/oil shocks affects the economy. 
 
An oil shock is defined as the gap between the expected price, by consumers, governments                             
and corporations, and the eventual outcome of the price. What constitutes a shock is that it is                                 
unexpected. Causes of oil shocks have historically been seen as an exogenous supply shock,                           
often caused by political events in big oil­producing countries. This understanding has been                         
challenged by recent research which gives the alternative explanation that most major oil                         
shocks are caused by changes in demand. 
The oil shock of 1973/1974 was a result of a withdrawal of the Tehran/Tripoli agreement by                               
the Gulf states. The agreement stipulated a fixed price over a five­year period and that foreign                               
oil companies were allowed to extract as much oil as possible for that price. The price might                                 
have seemed reasonable when the agreement was but had been eroded by dollar inflation and                             
higher demand for crude oil and in 1973, the Arab countries decided to cut production and                               
raise the price.  
The sharp oil price fluctuations in the 1980s which earlier has been attributed to the Iranian                               
revolution and the Iran­Iraq conflict can also partly be explained by an increase in demand.                             
The price hikes were probably caused by an increased inventory demand in anticipation that                           
the Iranian revolution would cause an oil shortage. 
The sharp price decline prices in 1986 were caused by members of OPEC cheating the agreed                               
price which in turn caused a revenue fall for the Saudi Arabian state. This in forced them to                                   
increase production in 1986. 
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When the US attacked Iraq in the early 1990s the price rose due to both a decrease in supply                                     
but also because of anticipated attacks on Saudi oil fields by Iraqi military forces. This caused                               




The earlier research concludes that the effect of a changing oil price on output is asymmetric.                               
An asymmetric effect means that economic activity is more harmed by an increasing oil price                             
than it is helped by a decreasing price aka a negative oil price shock. (Balke, Brown and                                 
Yucel, 2002) (Lardic & Mignon, 2006). Balke, Brown and Yucel, (2002) also researches                         
different channels by which oil price changes affects the American economy. They do this by                             
using a vector autoregressive model to try to establish through which channels the oil price                             
effect moves through. Among others, they are researching the relationship between bond                       
yields, oil price, and output. They present two main explanations to the nature of the                             
relationship between bond yields and the price of oil. High volatility in the price of oil causes                                 
financial distress which in turn affects yields. The other explanation is that the market                           
responds to changes in the real economy which will change the changing oil price. They also                               
take monetary policy into consideration for the asymmetric effect but are unable to find                           
conclusive evidence for this, although not ruling it out. Cologni and Manera (2008) in their                             
paper presents how the relationship between positive changes in oil prices affects the                         
economies of the G7 and through which channels the oil price effects these economies. They                             
in turn also presents two explanations similar to the ones Balke, Brown and Yucel, (2002)                             
suggested. 
 
Hooker (1996) is of the opinion that the role of the oil price in effecting economies has                                 
changed and that it's hard to find a simple relationship between oil price and macroeconomic                             
variables. His research is centered on the relationship between oil prices and recessions. He                           
claims that the relationship between recessions and changes in oil price is weak in the 1980s                               
but stronger before that period and he doesn’t find Granger causality between output and oil                             
price and unemployment and oil price after 1973. 
Several papers point out that there is a negative relationship between economic activity and a                             
higher oil price as well as between output and a decreasing oil price and output. The                               
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explanation presented is that a prices chock whether negative or positive on a major input                             
causes reallocation of capital and labor from the sectors affected negatively and into the                           
sector affected positively. This means that the effect of a higher oil price on productive                             
capacity in the sector with a high usage of oil will be amplified by the inability for the freed                                     
resources to be picked up somewhere else. On the other hand, when the oil price is decreasing                                 
and an economy is experiencing a negative oil shock the positive increase in ability in sectors                               
where oil is an important commodity will be mitigated by the inability for these industries to                               
find the right kind of labor. It will, therefore, be hard to take advantage of the lower price to                                     
expand output in these sectors. (Lilien, 1982). This theory is supported by Loungani (1986)                           





Mundell­Fleming is a model describing how interest rate and GDP growth is determined in                           
an open economy. It can be applied during both a fixed and a flexible exchange rate regime,                                 
and for different levels of capital mobility. It originates from the IS/LM model. 
The IS­curve (investment­saving) is showing all combinations of interest rate and GDP                       
growth where the goods market is in equilibrium, aggregate supply equals aggregate demand.                         
The LM­curve (liquidity preference­money supply) is showing all combinations of interest                     
rate and GDP growth where the money market is in equilibrium, money supply equals                           
aggregate money demand. Thus, the Mundell­Fleming equilibrium shows the interest­GDP                   
growth combination where both markets are in equilibrium. 
Since we are dealing with an open economy we need to take foreign trade and capital flows                                 
into account. We therefore add a third curve to the model, the BP­curve (balance of                             
payments). This curve is showing combinations of interest rate and GDP growth where the                           
balance of payments is in equilibrium (current account and capital account balance sums to                           
zero) at the current exchange rate.​(Daniels & VanHoose,​ 2014. s302ff.) 
The model is based on some fundamental assumptions: First of all we hold all other factors                               
fixed when testing the effect of a change in one variable. A fall in interest rate increases                                 
investment and thereby total GDP growth, since everything else is held constant. 
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A rise in interest rate attracts capital from abroad, since investors are assumed to be rational                               
and seek the highest possible return on their capital.​(Daniels & VanHoose,​ 2014. s302ff.) 
A rise in GDP growth will increase demand for money since more transactions will occur, the                               
increase in demand for money will drive up the interest rate, if money supply is held constant. 
An important factor in the model is the degree of capital mobility, which is how easily capital                                 
can flow across the borders of a nation, mainly determined by tariffs and regulations. The                             
lower level of capital mobility the steeper the slope of the BP curve, because a rise in interest                                   
rate won’t attract as much new capital when capital mobility is low. This means that the                               
economy has more influence on the domestic interest rate than in the theoretical case of                             
perfect capital mobility where the interest rate cannot differ from abroad, because all capital                           
would flow to the country where rate of return is highest (interest parity condition). The                             
BP­curve shifts upward because if the exchange rate is unchanged, an increase in GDP                           
growth will decrease net exports (increase in imports and unaffected exports (which depends                         
on exchange rate and foreign demand) and to compensate for a deficit in current account we                               
need a surplus in the capital (financial) account, the interest rate has to rise to attract more                                 
foreign capital keeping balance of payments in equilibrium. 
In the model we distinguish between perfect and imperfect capital mobility, and between                         
fixed and flexible exchange rates. ​The G7 countries all have high capital mobility and                           
flexible exchange rate which means a flatter BP­curve.​(Daniels & VanHoose,​ 2014. s302ff.) 
We will focus on the short run effect of an oil price change. The reason for this is that the                                       
long run effects are dependent on the reactions of policy makers and the financial markets                             
and harder to predict through the model. In the short run the model would predict a                               
decreasing interest rate and increasing GDP growth if the oil price declined and the opposite                             
if the oil price rose. An oil price shock affects the economy through the price level channel,                                 
the reason for this is a change in autonomous money demand When oil price goes up/down                               
the Md curve will shift upwards/downwards . If nominal money supply is unchanged this                           
means real money supply has decreased/increased. This in turn will shift the LM­curve                         
leftwards/rightwards. ​(Daniels & VanHoose,​ 2014. s302ff.) 
You could argue that the IS/LM/BP­model is normally used to describe a ​small open                           
economy (SOE), small meaning that its actions doesn’t affect the rest of the world. However                             
we do know that USA is considered a ​large open economy, meaning that its actions in fact                                 
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We will perform this study in essentially the same manner as Jiménez­Rodríguez & Sánchez                           
(2005). We will test how the model performs with data gathered from quarter one 1980 to                               
quarter four 2015. This means we will use 137 observations. 
We apply a VAR model (vector autoregression), where all variables are treated                       
symmetrically. This is advantageous since we are dealing with multiple time series which all                           
could affect each other. 
  yY = c +   ∑
p
i+1
Φi t−n + εt  
Where is a (n×1) vector of endogenous variables, is the (7×1) intercept  yt                 c , ..., )c = ( 1 . cn          
vector of the VAR, is the (7×7) matrix of autoregressive coefficients for i = 1, 2, …, p,        Φi                              
and is the (7×1) generalization of a white noise process. A VAR model is, to  ε , ..., )εt = ( t . εnt                              
explain it in simpler terms, a model where each variable (in this case) performs once as a                                 
dependent variable and six as an independent variable. The dependent variable is in every                           
case also present as an independent variable. Each variable is also expressed with ​n​ lags. 
We use quarterly data and the variables included in the model are: real GDP, real effective                               
exchange rate (REER), real oil price, real wage, inflation and short and long­term interest                           
rates. ( see Appendix for data references).  
As the main purpose is to analyze the effect of real oil price on real GDP growth and interest                                     
rate, these three variables are obviously added to the model. The remaining variables are                           
included to capture some of the most important transmission channels through which oil                         
prices may affect economic activity. These channels are the oil price change affecting                         
inflation which in turn affects exchange rates. Monetary policy will in turn affect short rates                             
which then affects long rates. We also incorporate the labour market by adding real wages                             
which affects aggregate demand. Some variables (real GDP, REER, real oil price and real                           
wage) are expressed in logs.  
We perform a augmented Dickey–Fuller to test if the variables is stationary. To be                           
conservative, we include four lagged differences to eliminate serial correlation in the error                         
term. We have to take the first difference of all the variables included.  
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As a second step we added a financial stress index (FSI), developed by the St Louis Federal                                 
Reserve Bank, to the model. This is one way in where we differ from Jiménez­Rodríguez and                               
Sánchez (2005). ​FSI is, as the name implies, a measure of the general level of stress in the US                                     
financial market, it is calculated using several interest rates, yield spreads and other indicators                           
such as volatility indexes. The interpretation for the FSI is that when the normal stress level is                                 
zero. When it is below zero the financial stress is lower than usual and when it is over zero                                     
the financial stress is higher than usual.(Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2014). We will                             
place FSI after the oil variable. The reason behind this is that we are interested in the oil                                   
variables affect on the other variables, including FSI and therefore we place it after the oil                               
variable. As specified by the way the model is constructed the variables can only affect the                               
variables it is placed before directly. Since it is a measure of financial stress the US, we use                                   
FSI only for USA and Canada, as they are the most compatible to the data, and we believed it                                     
was too unclear whether it could be applied on european countries. We did search for a                               
similar measure of financial stress for Europe but we only found data from 1999.  
 
To analyze oil price fluctuations we will, besides the real oil price variable (which henceforth                             
will be referred to as the symmetric variable) use four different oil price variables. The reason                               
to use them is to test/capture the asymmetric relationship between the oil price and                           
macroeconomic variables.. The real oil price impact on the economy is said to be non­linear,                             
several studies from the past find that a rise in oil price retards the economy more than a price                                     
fall stimulates it (Balke, Brown and Yucel, 2002)(Lardic & Mignon 2006). In order to test                             
for asymmetry we add one variable for oil price increase (O+) and another variable that only                               
measures oil price decreases (O­). They are calculated in the following way: 
 
ax (0, n(Oil )O+ = m l t  
in (0, n(Oil )O− = m l t  
 
This means that if there is an increase in oil price from the previous period it will equal that                                     
increase. If there is no increase or a decrease it will take the value of zero, it cannot have a                                       
negative number. 
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In the case of a price decrease, the variable will have a negative number corresponding to                               
that decrease, if there is no decrease or an increase will have a value of zero. Therefore it                                   
never has a positive number. 
To capture more long term changes in oil price, we add another two variables. These                             
variables are based on the same principles but instead of focusing only on the previous period                               
they compare current oil price to the four preceding periods. They are called NOPI (net oil                               
price increase) and NOPD (net oil price decrease). (Jiménez­Rodríguez & Sánchez, 2005) 
 
,ax (0, n(Oil )  ln(max(Oil , ...NOPI   = m l t −   t−1 . )))Oilt−4  
,in (0, n(Oil )  ln(min(Oil , ...NOPD  = m l t −   t−1 . )))Oilt−4  
 
NOPI tells us by how much the oil price has increased from the maximum price of the                                 
previous 4 periods. If the price is not higher than all 4 previous periods NOPI has a value of                                     
zero. It cannot have a negative value. This way of measuring an oil price shock was                               
introduced by econometrician James D. Hamilton (1996). 
NOPD is the difference between current price and the minimum price of the previous 4                             
periods. A decrease will therefore yield a negative number. However, it cannot have a                           
positive number, if the price is not lower than all four previous periods the NOPD will have a                                   
value of zero. We will conduct the regressions with each oil variable individually. 
With all variables onboard, we first look for ​Granger causality between variables, which                         
means the ability of one time series to predict another, with a certain time lag. After                               
performing a Granger causality­test we will be able to see whether the interaction between oil                             
price and the macroeconomic variables are significant. 
To choose the appropriate number of lags in the model we take help from Akaike Information                               
Criterion and Schwartz­Bayesian Information Criterion and then use Lagrange multiplier test                     
to check for autocorrelation and calculate the eigenvalues for the companion matrix to the                           
model to check the stability of the model. For most of the vector autoregressive model we                               







In the next step we want to see what the effect of oil price on GDP growth and interest rates                                       
actually looks like. We do this with the so­called orthogonalised impulse response function                         
(OIRF), which measures the reaction of one variable (response variable) to a change in                           
another variable (impulse variable) over a time line. We run this test on all significant                             
causations we got in the Granger test, and we then receive a table and a graph of each                                   
impulse­response pair, we set them to show the response from the time of the shock and 8                                 
years forward (Period 0­32). Because of this it is important in the way we place the variables                                 
because of a shock to the first variable affecting all the other variables contemporaneously                           
while the second variable only affect the variable placed after it contemporaneously and so                           
on. The ordering we choose is accordance to Jiménez­Rodríguez & Sánchez (2005). 























In the upcoming section, we will analyze the empirical results for the symmetric oil price                             
variable as well as the four asymmetric variables. Our sample consists of two oil­exporting                           
countries U.K and Canada and five oil importing countries, the U.S, Italy, Japan, Germany,                           
and France. The first part of the analysis will present the granger causality test performed                             
after the VAR:s for the different countries and oil price variables. The variables highlighted                           
in this, and the upcoming sections will be the different oil variable’s effect on GDP growth                               
followed by their effect on long­term interest rates as well as short­term interest rates. The                             
reason for our focus on these variables is that they are the variables highlighted in the                               
Mundell­Fleming framework. We will first present the Granger causality and present which                       
variables that are significant at the 5% (medium), and 1% (high) levels. In the next part of the                                   
analysis, we will add a new variable, Financial stress index, and look at how it changes the                                 
results of the regressions. In the last part, we will present in which way the oil price affects                                   







  Symmetric  Net oil price  Asymmetric 
  Ot  NOPI  NOPD  O ­  O + 
Country           
USA  0,296  0,139  0,058  0,000***  0,128 
CAN  0,084  0,380  0,000***  0,064  0,163 
FRA  0,105  0,693  0,115  0,045**  0,720 
U.K  0,001***  0,319  0,001*** 
  
0,015**  0,094 








Analyzing the oil price column, one can notice that the symmetric oil price has a significant                               
effect on real GDP growth in in the U.K and Germany. When looking at NOPD and its effect                                   
on real GDP growth we note a significance level for the oil exporting countries and Japan. 
The German GDP growth is Granger caused by NOPI and the O+ variable. We also find a                                 








  Symmetric  Net oil price  Asymmetric 
  Ot  NOPI  NOPD  O ­  O + 
Country           
USA  0,014**/0,127  0,067/0,007**  0,126/0,015**  0,002***/0,077  0,234/0,018** 
CAN  0,442/0,549  0,811/0,334  0,045**/0,001***  0,034***/0,241  0,553/0,804 
FRA  0,005***/0,157  0,789/0,278  0,028**/0,105  0,010**/0,041**  0,201/0,096 
U.K  0,266/0,255  0,801/0,661  0,012**/0,088  0,103/0,008***  0,0406**/0,753 
ITA  0,066/0,011**  0,659/0,381  0,748/0,024**  0,570/0,026**  0,018**/0,181 
GER  0,537/0,419 
  
0,948/0,554  0,399/0,043**  0,091/0,176  0,896/0,719 
JPN  0,087/0,102  0,610/0,700  0,049**/0,637  0,037**/0,447  0,382/0,146 
 
When looking at the symmetric oil price variable we find three significant relationships. On a                             
high significance level we find that the symmetric oil variable granger cause the long­term                           
interest rates in France. If we look at medium level we find a relationship between the                               
symmetric oil price variable and long rates for the U.S and between the symmetric oil price                               
and short rates for Italy. 
The price increase variables don’t seem to have as much effect on long­term interest rates                             
according to our results. The NOPI variable does not granger cause long­term rates to any                             
country on a high or medium significance level. We do find a significant granger causality                             
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between NOPI and U.S short rates. The O+ variable granger cause U.S Short rates as well as                                 
U.k long rates and Italian long rates. 
The effect of NOPD on long­term rates is on a medium significance level for Canadian long                               
rates. On a medium significant level we also find that NOPD granger cause U.K and Japanese                               
long rates. Between NOPD and short rates we find granger causality between Canadian short                           
rates on the highest significant level and to short rates on a medium level in the U.S,                                 
Germany, Italy and France. For O­ there is a high significance between the oil price and long                                 
rates for USA and Canada and medium level for Japanese long rates. The O­ also granger                               







  Symmetric  Net oil price  Asymmetric 
  Ot  NOPI(7 lag USA)  NOPD  O ­  O + 
Country           
USA  0,515  0,699  0,964  0,290  0,548 
CAN  0,001***  0,130  0,008***  0,007***  0,132 
 
When adding the FSI the symmetric oil price variable goes from weakly significant to                           
significant on a one percent level in it´s Granger causality on the Canadian GDP growth                             
while the US GDP growth show no significant result on the symmetric variable as well as on                                 
either of the other oil price variables. This is a change from before when we could find a                                   
causality between O­ and american GDP growth.  
We find a significant Granger relationship on the O­ variable and Canadian GDP growth.                           
This is also a change from before where we found no relationship between these variables. 
The NOPD variable granger cause Canadian GDP on a one percent level, but this is no                               
different from the regression without the FSI variable. We also find a new granger causation                             
from O­ to Canadian GDP growth. 
The result from adding the FSI variable to this limited size of the sample is that we found two                                     
new relationships and lost one.  
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The result when adding the FSI variable strengthens the results from before and makes new                             
findings but it also removes certain findings.Since the Granger test is for determining a                           
significant relationship it is in this part of the text hard to assess what this implies in regard to                                     







  Symmetric  Net oil price  Asymmetric 
  Ot  NOPI(7 lag USA)  NOPD  O ­  O + 
Country           
USA  0,012**/0,198  0,080/0,001***  0,012**/0,013**  0,003***/0,444  0,455/0,002*** 
CAN  0,747/0,000***  0,447/0,256  0,702/0,004***  0,913/0,000***  0,062/0,011** 
 
When adding the FSI we get a few more significant relationships and a few less. The                               
symmetric oil price still granger cause U.S long rates while we also find a new relationship                               
between symmetric oil price and Canadian short rates. The relationship between O­ and U.S                           
long rates is still present while the relationship between O­ and Canadian long rates                           
disappear. A new relationship is this fund between O­ and Canadian short rates. A new                             
relationship is found between NOPD and U.S long rates. Two other new result is that both                               




In this part, we will use impulse response functions (IRF) to analyze the previously found                             
Granger relationships with medium or high significance.This will show us how GDP growth                         
and interest rates respond to an oil price change . The oil price shocks will be negative for                                   
NOPD and O­ and positive for the other oil price variables. We will start by analyzing the                                 
different oil variables without FSI and then go on to analyzing the oil variables effect when                               
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the FSI variable has been added. We will compare the different oil price variables and                             




The countries affected by a shock to real GDP growth on a high significant level is one oil                                   
importing country and one oil exporting country, Germany and the U.K. Their response to a                             
positive shock path is quite similar with both experiencing a decrease in GDP growth, even                             
though Germany first experiencing a sudden increase which later sharply falls.  
With FSI included, the only significant granger causality on real GDP growth is Canada.                           
Here the effect is ambiguous and it isn’t of the same magnitude as with the two significant                                 
other countries without FSI included. The deviations from the equilibrium are smaller. The                         
response starts with a rise in GDP growth, with its peak after the first period. Then it dives                                   
and reaching the bottom after 6 periods. The recovery starts and it then exceeds zero again                               




The only country where the relationship between the real oil price and interest rates are                             
significant on a one percent level is between symmetric oil price and French long­term                           
interest rates. A shock to the symmetric oil price causes France long term rate to an                               
immediate increase followed by a prolonged dive and then stabilizing in the 15 to 20th                             
quarter after the shock. Mostly negative effect. 
One a five percent level we find a significant relationship between the symmetric oil price                             
and United States long term rates. A shock to the symmetric oil price starts a volatile reaction                                 
to long rates which moves up and down along the equilibrium line with the effect clearing out                                 
after about fifteen quarters. 
 
On the five percent level we find a relationship between the Italian short rates and a shock to                                   
the symmetric oil price. This causes the Italian short interest rates to take a hike in the first                                   
2­3 quarters followed by a prolonged negative trend which hits the floor under equilibrium                           
and then stabilizing in the fifteenth quarter. Mostly negative effect. 
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 With FSI added to the model, the effect on Canadian short term interest rate is ambiguous.                               
The effect comes after 3­4 periods, and first there is a rise in interest rate, then it falls until it                                       
reaches the bottom after 7­8 quarters, after 10 quarters it starts climbing to and then comes                               
back to zero around quarter 16, it finally levels out after 20 quarters. The reaction to U.S long                                   




A oil price increase, according to the model, should result in a decreasing GDP growth and                               
increasing interest rate. 
The relationship between a shock to symmetric oil price and GDP growth is weak and we                               
only find three significant relationships, two between oil exporters and GDP growth and one                           
between a oil importing country and GDP growth. The relationships look pretty similar                         
regardless of importing or exporting countries even if the magnitude is greater in the oil                             
importing country. A shock to the symmetric oil price causes a small increase followed by a                               
decrease in GDP growth. In short we find a relationship between a increasing symmetric oil                             
price and decreasing GDP growth even though it is limited to three countries. 
 
Regarding the interest rates the significant result are few. Before adding the FSI variable we                             
have three relationships between interest rates for oil importing countries and none for a oil                             
exporting country. When we add the FSI variable we get a significant result for a oil price                                 
shock on Canadian short rates. Of the relationships we find two is for short rates and two for                                   
long rates. One is an exporter three are importers. 
 
For the oil exporting country a shock to the oil price causes volatility to interest rates but it is                                     
hard/meaningless to describe it in way of a distinct increase/decrease. Regarding the                       
importing countries the shock to the symmetric oil price causes a downward slump in the                             




In conclusion the interest rates for the oil importers with significant result works the opposite                             




The highly significant relationships between the NOPD variable and GDP growth exist for                         
Canada, U.K and Japan and the O­ granger cause GDP growth for The U.S. The response in                                 
the movement for GDP growth to a one standard deviation shock in NOPD is different                             
between Canada and Japan and the U.K. For Canada a shock to NOPD causes GDP growth                               
to rise and then to fall back to equilibrium and stabilizing after about ten quarters. For Japan                                 
and the U.K the shock causes a negative effect to GDP growth which make a sudden increase                                 
just after the shock which then turns downwards and hits the floor under equilibrium and then                               
level out after roughly ten quarters. The difference is in the magnitudes. In Japan, a one                               
standard deviation shock has twice ass big effect on GDP growth than in the U.K.  
 
The effect of a shock to the O­ variable on the U.S GDP growth is a small decrease followed                                     
by an equally big increase followed by a decrease and then the effect levels out when we                                 
reach the tenth quarter. 
 
On the five percent level a shock to the O­ variable causes French GDP growth to fall to the                                     
tenth quarter and then stabilizing after about ten quarters. Japanese GDP growth show a                           
similar, negative, response. U.K GDP show a clear negative effect. 
When we add the FSI variable we still have a significant result for Canada on the NOPD                                 
variable but we also get a new significant result for the O­ variable. A shock to the NOPD                                   
variable with FSI looks similar to the effect without FSI. A shock to the O­ variable causes a                                   




The shock of the O­ have a significant effect on the Canadian long­term rate and on the U.S                                     
long­term rate where the magnitude and path is quite similar. The shock causes a volatile                             
reaction with no clear trend. The O­ variable have a negative effect on French rates where a                                 
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shock causes an immediate increase in French long rates which then turns down and turning                             
under equilibrium and then stabilizing after ten quarters. A shock to O­ causes Japanese long                             
rate to an immediate increase followed by a sharp decrease and then stabilizing in the tenth                               
quarter. 
On the five percent level we find a significant result between NOPD and the long rates for                                 
Japan. The effect to one a negative shock to the oil price is a negative effect to the Japanese                                     
long rates in the first quarters and then increasing and stabilizing in the fifteenth quarter.                             
NOPD causes U.K long rates to a sharp increase which then stabilizes. NOPD causes a                             
Canadian short decrease followed by a movement back to equilibrium followed by another                         
deep decrease and then stabilizing in the tenth quarter. A shock to NOPD causes French long                               
rates to an immediate sharp increase followed by a prolonged decrease which hits the floor                             
below equilibrium and then stabilizes before the tenth quarter. The effect is mostly negative. 
For the U.K, a shock to the O­ variable causes a sharp increase in the short rates followed by                                     
a decrease and it stabilizes in the tenth quarter. A shock to O­ causes Italian short rates to an                                     
immediate increase and then a fall under equilibrium and then stabilizing in the tenth quarter.                             
For the French short rate a shock to O­ causes a small increase followed by a decrease and the                                     
a volatile recovery to equilibrium. All have prolonged negative effects and immediate                       
increases. 
A shock to NOPD causes volatility in the short interest rate for Canada and it stabilizes after                                 
15 quarters. The response to U.S long rates are quite similar with a volatile response. Italian                               
and German short rates responses to a shock to NOPD are quite similar with an immediate                               
increase followed by a prolonged decrease under equilibrium which holds on until the tenth                           
quarter for Italy and continuing a bit longer for Germany. The effect is similar that of the O­                                   
variable. 
 
When we add the FSI variable the relationship on the one percent level between the O­                               
variable and U.S long term rates is still there while the Canadian relationship disappears. The                             
volatile effect is still present. 
On the five percent level when adding the FSI variable we find a relationship between NOPD                               
and U.S long rates ​while the relationship to Canadian long rates disappears. A shock to the                               
oil price variable causes the U.S long rates to go down in the first quarter and then stabilizing                                   
during the following quarters. The long rates have a more volatile response with both                           
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increases and decreases. The effect also have a longer effect slowly stabilizing in the                           
twentieth quarter. 
 
On the one percent level for the FSI we find a relationships both between NOPD and O­ and                                   
the Canadian short interest rates. The relationship between O­ and Canadian short rates are                           
new. A negative shock to the O­ causes an increase in the short rates about five quarters in                                   
while the the NOPD effects is smaller in magnitude and no sharp changes. 
On the five percent level when adding the FSI variable the relationship between NOPD and                             




According to the Mundell Fleming model a decrease in the oil­price would lead to a                             
decreasing interest rate and an increasing GDP growth. Both for the NOPD and O­ minus                             
variable the effect to GDP growth looks similar across countries on the one percent level as                               
well as on the five percent level, even though the magnitudes are little different. The effect of                                 
a decreasing oil price is negative on GDP growth for Japan, France and the U.K while the                                 
effect for U.S and Canada are more volatile. For the NOPD variable the slope of the curve are                                   
steeper, which is expected, while the O­ variable causes more volatility. 
 
When we add the FSI variable to the Canadian and American sample we get a significant                               
negative effect for the Canadian GDP growth on the O­ variable while the NOPD stays                             
significant. The effect on GDP growth is still volatile. 
 
Concerning the decreasing oil price effect on interest rates the effect is harder to generalize.                             
For Canada and the U.S the effect, both on long and short rates and for both variables, is that                                     
a shock to the oil variables cause volatility in the interest rates. For the other economies the                                 
short rates, on both variables, moves first up during a brief time and then decreasing under                               
equilibrium and then stabilizes. For France and Japan this is also the case for the long rates to                                   
a shock to O­. The effects is mostly negative. For NOPD almost every economy reacts                             
differently where U.K:s interest rates increases while French Japanese and Canadian decrease                       
although with different magnítudes and the French long rates first increasing. Two main                         
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patterns materialize, one where a decrease causes volatility and one where a fall in oil price                               
causes short rates to increase immediately and then falling below equilibrium before                       
stabilizing. It is therefore hard to make any clear cut generalizations. You could say that the                               
prediction of the model is semi correct regarding a decreasing price effect on interest rates,                             
except in the case of U.K long rates for the NOPD variable where it acts the opposite of the                                     
theory and in the cases when it shows a volatile effect. 
When adding the FSI variable we get one new significant relationship, between Canadian                         
short rates and the O­ variable while losing the relationship to Canadian long rates. The                             
reaction to a shock to O­ looks similar to how other countries interest rates react without FSI.                                 
We also get a new relationship between NOPD and U.S long rates while losing the                             
relationship between NOPD and Canadian long rates. The effect to the U.S long rates is                             
volatile. 
To summarize GDP growth acts the opposite of the model. For the interest rates we can find                                 
two main patterns. One where the interest rates act volatile (USA and Canada) and thus partly                               




For the asymmetric and net increase variables, we have highly significant causations on GDP                           
growth for Germany (NOPI and O+) and Italy (O+). Comparing O+ and NOPI graphs for                             
Germany we notice that they are very similar. Initially a sharp rise followed by a similar fall                                 
after 2­3 quarters. Then the recovery towards the initial level starts almost immediately. The                           
effect is over within ten quarters. The effect mostly negative. 
For Italy, the effect is a little different from Germany. The fluctuations of GDP growth is of a                                   
much smaller magnitude. First a dive and after one period it starts rising, it then fluctuates                               





There is no relationship between increasing oil price and interest rates on the one percent                             
level. On the five percent level we find a significant relationship between U.S short rates and                               
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NOPI as well as between O+ and U.S short rates as wella s between O+ and U.K short rates                                     
and O+ and Italian short rates.. A increase in NOPI causes volatility in the U.S long rates                                 
followed by a fall five quarters in. It then turns upward and stabilizes fifteen quarters in. A                                 
shock to O+ causes a similar pattern where the U.S short rates goes down to the tenth quarter                                   
and then begins to stabilize. 
A shock to O+ causes U.K short rates to increase a little and the a prolonged downturn and                                   
stabilization to equilibrium in the fifteenth quarter. The Italian short rates show a similar                           
pattern when experiencing a shock to the O­ variable but the magnitudes of the increase is                               
larger and the following path is less volatile than the british. 
 
On the five percent level when adding the FSI variable we find a new relationship between                               
the O+ variable and the Canadian short rates. The effect is however small and a shock to the                                   




According to Mundell­Fleming a increase in the the oil price would have a negative impact                             
on output and raise interest rates. 
The significant relationships found are few for the increasing oil price variables. For                         
Germany and Italy the effect from NOPI and O+ where a more volatile effect on GDP growth                                 
than a decreasing effect, with a sharp immediate increase followed by a similar negative                           
effect and then leveling out.  
The relationship between the interest rates and a increasing oil price is different for long rates                               
and short rates. For the long rates the effect is a sharp immediate effect stabilizing back to                                 
equilibrium for Italian rates and for the U.K the effect is volatile. The significant relationships                             
between the increasing oil price variables can be described a mostly negative or volatile. 
 
To summarize the effect to GDP is in contrast to the model with no clear negative or positive                                   
responses. The short rates correspond opposite to the model while the long rates move in                             
accordance to the model. 
Since there are few significant result it is hard to generalize the result. We only have eight                                 
significant relationship on both price increase variables. The few significant results is a sign                           
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So how does the oil price­macroeconomy relationship work and how does a economy react to                             
changes in oil price? Does the Mundell­Fleming theoretical framework predictions about a                       
higher/lower price resulting in a Higher/lower interest rate and lower/higher output?  
 
We find twelve significant results for the NOPD variable and ten for O­. In comparison the                               
we only found two and six significant granger causations for the NOPI and O+ variables.  
For NOPD we have three(Canada, Japan och U.K) significant granger causations to GDP                         
growth. Out of these one response is positive(Canada) and two are negative(Japan and U.K).                           
For O­ we also find three (USA, Canada and France) granger causations to GDP growth. Of                               
these one response (France) is negative and two (USA and Canada) is volatile. For the NOPI                               
variable we find one(Germany) Granger causation to GDP growth and the response is                         
volatile. The O+ variable have two(Italy and Germany) granger causations to GDP growth.                         
Both responses are volatile. The symmetric variable have three(Canada, Germany and U.K)                       
granger causations to GDP growth. One response (Canada(when FSI is added)) is volatile and                           
two(Germany and U.K) are negative. 
 
When it comes to effect on interest rates, there are more significant relationships with the                             
price decreasing variables than price increasing. For NOPD we got five significant                       
relationships on long rates (USA, Canada, Japan, France and the U.K) and four on short rates                               
(USA, Canada, Italy and Germany). Of these, two responses are negative (France and Japan),                           
one is positive (U.K) and two are volatile (USA and Canada) on the long rates. On the short                                   
rate the response is negative for two (Italy and Germany) and volatile for two (USA and                               
Canada). 
For O­ we got four significant granger relationships on the long rates (USA, Canada, Japan                             
and France) and three on short rates(Italy, France and U.K). Of these two are                           
negative(France and Japan) and two are volatile (USA and Canada) on the long rates. On the                               
short rates all responses are negative. 
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For NOPI we have a granger causation on short rates when we add FSI (USA). This effect is                                   
negative. For the O+ variable we have two significant result on the long rates (U.K and Italy)                                 
and two for the short rates (USA and Canada(when FSI is added)). Of these the response on                                 
the long rate is positive. On the short rate one response (USA) is mostly negative and one                                 
(Canada) is volatile.  
On the symmetric variable we have two (USA and France) granger causations on the long                             
rates (The relationship between oil price and long rates appears for the U.S when we add the                                 
FSI variable) . Of these one response (France) is a sharp increase followed by a prolonged                               
decrease and one (USA) is volatile. We also have two (Canada and Italy) granger causations                             
on short rates. Of these one response (Italy) negative and one response (Canada) is volatile.   
 
According to the Mundell­Fleming framework the relationship between exogenous oil price                     
change and GDP growth is negative and the relationship between exogenous oil price and                           
interest rates are positive in the short term (​Daniels & VanHoose, 2014. s.302ff). The only                             
increase in GDP growth we experience is for Canada on the NOPD variable. Our main result                               
points to a fall in GDP growth whether there is a decrease or increase in the oil price. This is                                       
a clear break with the predictions of the model. The interest rates for the decreasing oil price                                 
moves in accordance to the model, except for the French long rates which in both the O­ and                                   
NOPD first experience an immediate increase in followed by a decrease under equilibrium                         
before stabilizing.  
For the interest rates for the increasing oil price variables the long rate moves in accordance                               
to the models and the short interest rates move in the opposite direction. 
We can therefore conclude that the Mundell­Fleming modells prediction fits badly to our                         
sample when it comes to GDP but better for interest rates except for short interest rates for                                 
increasing oil price. But since the Mundell­Fleming theoretical framework is a combination                       
of interest rate level and GDP the model as a whole also fits badly to our tested sample. The                                     
overall conclusion is that its predictions fits badly to the empirical data. What does these                             
findings finding mean for the IS/LM framework in general? The interest channel generally                         
worked in the way the model predicted but since the oil­output relationship broke down it´s                             
hard to say what that means for the model. It could imply that the LM­curve should be                                 
completely horizontal but then it won't have an effect on output. The IS/LM framework, its                             
validity post 2008 and how it should, and could, be changed to better grasp economic reality                               
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is currently being debated by, among others, Scott Sumner and Olivier Blanchard (Blanchard,                         
2016) (Sumner, 2016). Blanchard (2016) wants to revive the model by getting rid of the LM                               
curve and change it to a curve corresponding to changes in the policy rates by the central                                 
banks. He also suggests to stop teaching the AS/AD framework altogether. This might be in                             
line with our findings where the relationship between changes in exogenous factors and                         
responses by a central bank seems to fit our result better. Sumner (2016) criticise this                             
standpoint on the account that the monetary authority's problem with the zero lower bound                           
traps the model. He also argues that this would mean that a leftward move in the IS­curve                                 
won't result in a declining interest rate and thus interest rate changes will always look like a                                 
result from a easy money policy. This is a good point. It is hard to make a recommendation                                   
on changes in macro models only when accounting for one type of cause and effect, in our                                 
case an oil price change, but it also highlights one of the greatest problems of macro models,                                 
the ability to handle complex multiplicity. 
 
You could describe what we have found as a asymmetric effect in GDP growth to an oil price                                   
change. The effect on interest rate is partly asymmetric with account to the short rates for the                                 
increasing oil price variables.  There are earlier research that support these findings.  
Lilien (1982. s.780ff.) explain that a decreasing oil price has a contractionary effect on GDP                             
growth by the fact that decreases, as well as increases, leads to reallocation of labour from                               
industries where oil is an important input to industries that don´t uses oil in the same capacity                                 
in an increase and in the opposite way in a decrease. Since this process takes time i´t becomes                                   
hard to take advantage of a oil price decrease/increase and therefore both increasing and                           
decreasing oil prices can cause contractions in GDP growth. The contractionary effect is                         
caused hy reallocation. It should be noted that since this theory stems from the 1980:s and the                                 
validity of it might be questioned because of structural changes in the G7 industrial                           
construction.  
  
Balke, Brown and Yucel, (2002), Cologni and Manera (2008) and Lardic & Mignon 2006),                           
among others, also finds support for an asymmetric relationship. It is surprising that                         
international organizations like the IMF expected the falling price to cause a boom to output                             
when there are empirical work conducted that points to the fact that the oil price have a clear                                   
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asymmetric effect on GDP growth. The question that arises are what explanations could be                           
found to this phenomenon.   
Balke, Brown and Yucel, (2002. s.50.) attribute the asymmetric effect of oil price changes on                             
interest and GDP growth to two explanations. The first explanation relates to interest rates.                           
Interest rates change to market anticipation of an asymmetric effect to the real economy to be                               
realized later. Translated you could claim that an increase in long rates in an oil price increase                                 
could be a indication that´the price is suspected to last while a decreasing long rate in a oil                                   
price decrease is a indication that the effect will be prolonged. We had a symmetric effect on                                 
interest rates for both decreasing and increasing variables except for short rates in the                           
increasing variables which went opposite of the Mundell­Fleming framework. Our                   
asymmetric originated in the short rates rather than in the long, Short rates are controlled by                               
policy makers and not by expectations of the market. What is interesting here is that the long                                 
rates and short rates goes in different directions to the shock in the increasing oil price                               
variables, this could be an indication that the markets believes the higher oil price to either                               
fuel real interest or inflation more than the policy makers. Unfortunately the significant                         
effects are so few that you it´s hard to say anything conclusive, 
The other explanation presented is that the asymmetric effect originates in financial stress                         
brought on by the oil price change. The financial stress affects the real economy and interest                               
rates in a negative way. 
 
To check this we follow Nazlioglu, Soytas and Gupta (2015) recommendation to add the FSI                             
variable when analyzing oil price changes to capture this effect and single it out from other                               
changes. When we add the FSI variable the significance of the oil price variable changes in                               
nine cases, three for GDP growth and six for the interest rates. Of these changes three are lost                                   
significant relationships and six are gained significant relationship between the oil variables                       
and the response variables under study. This could point to the theory highlighted by Balke et                               
al (2002. 50f) and Nazlioglu, Soytas and Gupta (2015), that the effect of financial stress is a                                 
big contributor to oil prices effect on interest rate. 
When adding the FSI variable we get a new significant result between the O­ variable and                               
Canadian GDP growth where the variable causes volatility in GDP growth​. ​For the US the                             
relationship is the opposite where the relationship between O­ and GDP disappears. A new                           
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granger causation is also found between the symmetric oil variable and Canadian GDP                         
growth. Also here the effect is volatile. 
Concerning the interest rates relationship with FSI included, we get some more significant                         
results on especially short rates. For the symmetric variable we gain a significant granger                           
causality to Canadian short rates where the relationship is volatile. On the NOPD variable we                             
lose the significant relationship to Canadian long rates while we gain a significant                         
relationship to U.S long rates where we find a volatile reaction. For the O­ variable we lose a                                   
significant relationship to Canadian long rates and gain one to Canadian short rates. Both of                             
these new relationship is volatile. We also gain a new significance between the O+ and                             
Canadian short rates . The sample we test the financial stress variable on is limited and it is                                   
thus hard to draw any general conclusion about the effect of financial stress. But for these                               
two economies there were definitely a difference in results. Most new and lost results came                             
from the relationship between the oil price variables and interest rates. This could be an                             
indication that the theory lifted by Balke, Brown and Yucel, (2002) that the asymmetric                           
relationship between interest rates and oil price changes could be attributed to financial stress.                           
The lost relationships between the interest rate and oil price changes could be caused by the                               
variation previously attributed to interest rates where in fact variation coming from some sort                           
of financial stress and when the FSI variable was added the relationship between changes in                             
oil price and interest rates became insignificant.  
The new relationships emerging when adding the FSI could be caused by the new variable                             
capturing the noise interfering with the interpretation of the oil price /GDP growth/interest                         
rate relationship. When that noise got cleaned out we could capture the significant                         
relationship between oil price and GDP growth/interest rates. Overall the variable added new                         
results to our study because of the added significant results. These new significant result                           
confirmed the volatile reactions to both the U.S economy and Canadian on account to                           
changes in oil price. Nazlioglu, Soytas and Gupta (2015) result is thus strengthens by our                             
findings. We can also conclude that the results that become insignificant when adding the FSI                             
are the ones attributed to oil price changes causing financial stress described by Balke, Brown                             




Our few significant Granger causality relationship found is well established in the literature.                         
(Hooker, 1996 s.196) Jiménez­Rodríguez and Sánchez (2005. s.215ff) found few significant                     
result for the decreasing oil price variables but more for the increasing oil price variables.                             
This is the opposite of our study where we found more significant relationships on the                             
decreasing oil price variables on both GDP growth and interest rates few on the increasing oil                               
price variables. It should be highlighted that we don’t use the exact same variables on the                               
decreasing price. They for example use a scaled price variable we don´t use. But they use the                                 
same variables for the increase (O+ and NOPI) and here we get different result as reported                               
above.  
One could question the stability of the oil parameter and also the effect of the financial crisis                                 
2007­2008. The crash and the following strange behaviour of many macroeconomic variables                       
could help explain the asymmetric relationship. One could also ask if oil has the same role in                                 
the G/ countries it had twenty, thirty or forty years ago.  
A big drop in oil price was triggered by the financial crash of 2008 and the declining demand.                                   
In that sense it is the decreasing demand that causes the price to decrees and not the other                                   
way around. But as Nazlioglu, Soytas and Gupta (2015) points to financial stress and oil price                               
trigger each other and thus the initial financial worry could trigger a response in oil price that                                 
in turn trigger the financial stress and output and it might seem as a decares in price cause a                                     
decrease in output even though the relationships is that they cause each other in waves. 
This could also explain the asymmetric result for the short interest rates to an increase in oil                                 
price. Since the crash 2008 monetary policy has been focused on keeping interest rates down                             
to initiate investment (Joyce et al, 2012). At the same time the oil price catched up from the                                   
decrease triggered from the crisis and went even higher compared to before the crash. The                             
explanation to why it looks like the interest rate­increasing oil price relationship broke could                           
be that unorthodox monetary policy conducted after the 2008 crash with rate hike after rate                             
hike makes it look like there is a relationship between a increasing oil price and decreasing                               
interest rates while this might not be the fact at all. We can have found a´nonsensical                               
relationship. It is hard to say something definitive about this but it is clear that the one can                                   
question the stability of the parameters and the non normal situation after 2008 can play a                               
role in our results.  
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6. Conclusion 
Both policy makers and researchers predicted that the 2014 oil­price decrease would result in 
an output increase. Their hopes was put to shame when the predicted increase failed to 
emerge.  Our results, which follows the results from previous research,  is that a decrease in 
oil price as well as an increase in oil price causes GDP growth to decrease in the short term. 
For interest rates we find a symmetric relationship except for the short term rates to an 
increasing oil price.  Our result for GDP growth is thus contradictory to the Mundell­Fleming 
framework where a oil price change should have a negative relationship to GDP growth. For 
interest rate our result is partly in line with the model. 
This relationship between oil price and GDP growth and interest rates is referred to as a 
asymmetric effect in the literature and is explained partly as a result from market 
expectations, financial stress brought on by the oil change and the effect of reallocation of 
labour from oil intensive industries to less intensive industries and vice versa. Another 
possibility to the relationship between increasing oil price and decreasing interest rate could 
be a result from the unorthodox monetary policy conducted post ­ 2008. It is also possible 
that a instability of the oil price parameters are affecting the results. Economic data have 
behaved strange post 2008 and it is possible that this plays a part also here,even if our results 
are in line with previous research. This would be interesting to investigate further.  
 
For the part of the sample where we add the financial stress variable (FSI) we get different 
result from the one where we don't use the variable. We get both new significant result and 
some significant results disappearing. The effect of the oil price looks similar both with FSI 
and without it, even if we capture some more volatility with the FSI variable. It would be 
interesting to use a similar variable for the rest of the sample. This is also something that 
should be further researched. 
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8. Appendix 
 
8.1 Data sources 
The data used in this study are from 1980:I to 2015:IV. The corresponding sources are as 
follows: 
 
Real GDP: IMF data (Real GDP (seasonally adjusted) Index from IFS database line 99bvr)) 
Nominal oil price: IMF (Primary commodity prices), UK Brent price (line 11276AAZZF). 
US Producer price Index:IMF data (PPI from IFS line 63) 
Real Oil price: Nominal oil price deflated by US Producer price Index. 
Real effective exchange rate: OECD data, line CCRETT01. 
Short term interest rate: IMF (IFS, line 60c, Treasury Bill Rate) for all except Japan which is 
from IFS line 60b (Money market) and Germany which is from OECD data line IR3TIB. 
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Long term interest rate: IMF (IFS, line 61, Government Bond Yield)  
Nominal wage:  OECD data, line LCEAMN01. These data are adjusted for seasonality. 
Consumer price index: OECD data , line CPALTT01. These data are adjusted for seasonality. 
Real wage: Nominal wage deflated by CPI. 
FSI: Federal reserve bank of Kansas City Financial Stress Index, Index, Quarterly, Not 
Seasonally Adjusted 
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